This study used data from a recent telephone survey of Washington, D.C. parents to evaluate the success of the District's large and growing charter school program. Results for 384 parents show that parents with children in charter schools rate their teachers, principals, facilities, and schools overall higher than their traditional public school counterparts in quality of facilities and teachers, and overall. This finding is robust even when controlling for self-selection into charter schools. While the act of choice by itself may contribute to higher parental evaluations of charter schools, the evidence points to a foundation for these higher evaluations in addition to the fact of having chosen the school. (Contains 3 tables and 31 references.) (SLD) Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original document.
technology, class size and curriculum. Teachers also seem to like charter schools, with high levels of teacher satisfaction found among charter teachers (Koppich 1998) .
There are several foundations for this greater satisfaction with charter schools.
Perhaps the strongest is that of "allocative efficiency" education is a complex, multifaceted "good," and choice allows parents to select schools that deliver the kind of education they want for their children (Schneider, Teske, and Marschall 2000) . This link between choice and higher parent satisfaction dates at least as far back as Milton Friedman's original argument in favor of vouchers in the 1950s (Friedman 1955) .'
In his pioneering work, Friedman made a strong appeal for consumer sovereignty, arguing that higher levels of satisfaction with schools will flow from maximizing the freedom of parents to choose schools. Other analysts have also explored this link between sovereignty and satisfaction (see especially Coons and Sugarman [1978] and Raywid [1989] ). From this perspective, choice increases parental evaluation of choice schools because it increases the ability of parents to match their preferences for specific values, needs or pedagogical approaches with the school. As Goldring and Shapira put it: "The family sovereignty position suggests choice leads to greater satisfaction in that it accommodates individual family preferences, mainly in the areas of curricula, teaching philosophy, and religion. Parents will be satisfied in exercising their fundamental right of individual choice and freedom of belief about the best education for their children." (1993: 397) In addition to increasing this match between preferences and schools, choice may change the schools themselvesmaking better "products" available for parents to choose Many of the factors discussed here are associated with choice in general, and have not been developed specifically for charter schools as a form of choicebut clearly apply to the charter school option as well. 5 among. Indeed, fundamental to the push for choice is the idea that choice unleashes competitive pressure on the schools that makes them improveand charter schools are often seen as a central tool to leverage such change (see, e.g., Teske at al. 2000) . While the debates still rage about the effect of choice on academic outcomes, there are other outcomes from choice that are less contestedand which can increase parental evaluations.
For example, many charter schools are designed to change the relationship between administrators, teachers, parents and students, to create what Coleman (1988) refers to as "functioning communities." In these communities, the tighter links from the school to parents, families, and students is associated with better educational experiences and all parties, including teachers, are more satisfied (Driscoll 1993) . This link underlies the basic findings developed in the research on "effective schools," which has shown that good interpersonal relations between members of the school community and shared beliefs and values combine to promote good teaching and a positive learning environment. For example, charter schools usually have a culture (and sometimes even a written contract) that provides parents opportunities to influence school management and to become more involved with the processes of school governance and functioning (see, for example, Peterson and Campbell 2001; Finn et al. 1997) . To the extent that this does occur, parental evaluations of their children's' schools may improve (Chubb and Moe 1990; Raywid 1989; Goldring and Shapira 1993). It is also important to consider that choice seeks not only to empower parents but also to change the role of students, making them more central in the design of education programs and in the functioning of the schools. In short, one goal of choice is to increase 6 5 the attention paid by schools to student needs (Hill 1997) . Indeed, choice seems to improve student-teacher relations. For example, in her study of the effects of choice, Driscoll (1993) found that choice students were more likely to report "they got along well with teachers, that the quality of teaching was high, and that teachers praised them and listened to them." (1993 ( , 158). Finn et al. (1997 found that large numbers of charter school students liked the "good teachers" in their schools, who, according to these students, teach until they learn the material and who don't let students fall behind. To the extent that this behavioral change strengthens the ties between students and teachers and increases the level of student satisfaction with the schools, parental satisfaction with the schools should in turn increase.
Finally, choice may put pressure on administrators, teachers and staff to be more "consumer friendly." As Hassel writes with regard to charter schools as schools of choice: "charter schools cannot take their 'customers' for granted. Their very survival depends on the degree to which families believe the schools are responding to family preferences and working hard to provide the education they demand." (1999: 6; also see Teske et al. 2000) . Thus rather than being isolated from the demands of parents, the competitive pressures on charter schools should increase their responsiveness to parent demandsand responsiveness should lead to higher evaluations.
While these are all strong reasons to believe that choice should lead to actual improvements in schools that will in turn lead to higher evaluation of schools by parents, there are two related possibilities that provide an alternative explanation to the higher evaluations by choice parents. 7 6 First, the act of choice alone may increase satisfaction. For example, Erikson argues that parents "who actively choose the schools which their children attend, from among a variety of options, seem far more satisfied with their schools than are parents who simply do the 'normal' thing, with little thought." (Erikson 1986: 105; also see Goldring and Shapira 1993) . For Erikson, the causal mechanism underlying this relationship between choice and satisfaction is related to the investment of energy and time that parents put into choice. Given this investment, even if there are no visible reasons for choice to increase satisfaction, many parents may seek to justify their choice and their investment of resources by selectively gathering and interpreting information about performance and by indicating increased satisfaction with their child's school viewing the school through "rose colored glasses." (Erikson 1982) .
Indeed, almost every study of schools of choice, regardless of type of choice and regardless of evidence of improved performance (or lack thereof), has found higher levels of parent satisfaction (see, for example, Bridge and Blackman 1978, Moe 2001, Peterson 1998, Witte, Bailey, and Thorn 1992 on vouchers; Bierlin 1997 on charter schools and Schneider, Teske, and Marschall 2000 on public school choice). Moe also finds that parents who moved to "buy" good schools were more satisfied and argues, "residential choicethe choice of specific neighborhoods or specific schoolspromotes greater satisfaction." (2001: 84) A second explanation is that most choice plans are what Elmore calls "option demand" choice (Elmore 1991). In contrast to a system of "universal choice" where all parents must choose, option demand choice consists of a two-stage process. First, parents must "choose to choose"that is, they must be dissatisfied enough with their existing 8 7 schools or be sufficiently attracted to an alternative to their neighborhood school that they decide to exercise choice. Once they decide to choose, the parent then has to select among the alternatives to find a school in which to enroll her child.
Given this two-stage process, the possibility of endogeneity due to self-selection must be taken into account when studying any outcomes of choice. That is, it is likely that the individuals who choose to choose are not representative of the entire population of parents (see, for example, Schneider, Teske, and Marschall 2000) and the characteristics that are motivating them to choose may affect their subsequent behavior and attitudes toward the schools. To the extent this is true, simple comparisons of choosers and non-choosers are not accurate and the higher evaluations of choice schools found among parents may be a function of the factors that led them to choose in the first place. This endogenity factor can compound the rose-colored glasses effect, since those who choose to choose may be the parents most dissatisfied with their child's schools and may find any alternative school superior.
Are Differences in School Evaluations a Function of Self-Selection?
We asked a sample of parents in Washington DC to assign grades ranging from F to A for three different aspects of their child's school: their child's teacher, principal, and school facilities. We also asked them to assign an overall grade to their child's school.2
In this paper, our task is to assess the extent to which the higher evaluations of DC charter schools we report below are robust to the fact that charter schools are option demand systems of choice and therefore parents who choose to choose may be systematically different than parents who have left their children in the traditional public a host of models have been developed to control for it. In this paper, we use a propensity score matching procedure that we detail below.
A Caveat about Using Grades
Before proceeding with the analysis, we note that there is a well-known pattern when using grades as measures of parent evaluations of schoolsparents almost inevitably give high grades to their children's schools. For example, Phi Delta Kappa regularly asks a sample of parents to grade their children's schools. In 2001, 51 percent of parents gave their own children's schools either an A or a B-11 percent gave the grade of A, while 40 percent gave a B. Note that the grades parents give to their own children's school are higher than the grades they assign to the nation's schools as a whole (where only 23 percent gave grades of A or B).3 And note too that parents are also more likely to give high grades than non-parentsfully 62 percent of parents gave grades of A or B to schools. However, we believe that this bias is not important for our analysis, since we are interested in comparing parents in the charter schools and the traditional public schools in the same city and ultimately we do control for conditions that could affect parents in the two sectors differently.
How do Parents Grade Their Schools?
In Table 1 , we report the mean scores' for charter school parents and traditional DC public school parents on each of the four aspects of schools (teachers, principals, facilities and overall) with which we are concerned, and we report the significance of any charter school, coded 1 if the respondent's child is in a DC charter school. This is the key variable of interest in our analysis. a set of 3 dichotomous variables for self-reported race (Hispanic, white, other, with African-American the excludedand modalcategory), residential mobility (measured by two variables: the number of years the respondent has lived in DC and the number of years the person has lived in her current neighborhood), respondent's years of schooling, whether the respondent thought about moving residence in the past year to get their child into a better school (coded dichotomously 0 or 1), whether the respondent applied for a private school for their child in the past year (again coded dichotomously 0 or 1), involvement with school activities (1 if respondent reports volunteering for a school event in the past year), and school size. There is accumulating evidence that small school size is associated with a range of positive education outcomes (see for example Cotton 1996) and, compared to traditional public school parents, about twice as many charter school respondents have students in small schools. Our measure is simply the number of students in the child's school.
The results of the three ordered probit analyses of school, teacher and facility grades are presented in Table 2, below. fix the constant term at zero, thus allowing identification and the estimation of all cutpoints. For details, see (Greene 2000) . 13 12 [ Table 2 About Here]
As Table 2 illustrates, the coefficient of the charter school covariate is significant for all three analysesparents with children in charter schools rate their schools, their teachers, their principals and their school's facilities higher, even when controlling for a host of other factors. However it is difficult to tell by simple inspection of a table of ordered probit results exactly how much a given covariate matters or, in our case, the estimated difference in means of evaluations for charter and non-charter parents (Greene 2000).
To create these estimates, we use stochastic simulation (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2000) to estimate predicted probabilities and use these to construct mean scores for charter school parents and traditional DC public school parents that we enter into Table 1 . We find that once we introduce controls, the differences between charter school parents and DCPS parents actually become somewhat larger than in the naive model. Finally, in Model 3, we test for the degree to which higher evaluations are robust to self-selection effects. As we note above, results from quasi-experimental studies of the effects of public policy (or other "treatments") are potentially biased when the factors predicting self-selection into the program (here, charter schools) are correlated with the outcome measures (Greene 2000; Maddala 1983). One solution to this problem is the estimate of some form of parametric "treatment effects" model, usually by means of a consistent two-step or full-information maximum likelihood model (for a summary see (Greene 2000; Maddala 1983) ). Here we instead a semiparametric estimator originally introduced by RoSenbaum and Rubin (1983; 1985) in a biometric context and recently 13 14 applied in econometrics (Dehejia and Wahba 1998; Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997;  List et al. Forthcoming) known as propensity score matching.
The logic underlying this method is to construct, from quasi-experimental data, a matched set of treatment and control observations as if a true random-assignment experiment had been conducted. By computing the propensities of the respondents to choose to undergo the treatment and then matching individuals with identical scores in the treatment and control groups, a new dataset is constructed in which the treatment outcome is exogenous to self-selection. The difference of means for the two groups can then be estimated using several possible techniques. Propensity score matching has several advantages over more familiar treatment effects models, such as relaxation of restrictive parametric assumptions. Moreover, as Dehij a and Wahba (1998) conclude, matching provides estimates of the treatment effects more similar to randomized field trials than can be obtained using other corrections for self-selection.'
We follow Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983; 1985) and first estimate a probit model to calculate predicted probabilities of a respondent having a child in a charter school, and then use these values as the propensity score for matching (note that control observations can be used to match to more than one treatment observation): We then compare the difference of mean evaluations of this matched set of charter and non-charter parents with a t-test and report our results in Table 1 . 6 We should note that we did estimate other methods for controlling self-selection, and the results we ?resent are robust to alternative methods and to alternative selection equations. We present the results of our probit model in Table 3 of the Appendix. While every variable in the equation is related to the propensity to choose, consistent with the demands of the propensity matching procedure, our concern with this probit model is not testing theory, but rather to obtain as good a fit as possible.
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As evident in Table 1 , the differences between parents in the two sectors are even larger than in the other models and, again, are statistically significant. In short, the higher evaluations assigned by charter school parents are not simply a function of choice.
The Foundation for Higher Evaluations Is Stronger Than the Act of Choice Alone
In this research we asked parents in Washington DC to evaluate their children's schools using familiar letter grades. We then compared these grades across parents whose children are enrolled in the DC charter schools with those among parents whose children remained in the traditional DC public schools. We found that, across each of the four aspects of schools we measured, parents in the DC charter schools evaluated their child's school more highly than did parents in the traditional DC public schools. We employed three increasingly complex models to assess the extent to which these findings are robust.
We find strong evidence that parents in the DC charter schools evaluate their facilities much higher (by between one-half to over three-quarters of a grade on average, depending on the model) than other parents. Charter school parents also give their teachers and their principals higher grades, although not the differences, ranging from one-quarter to one-third of a grade, are not quite as large as those we report for facilities.
In terms of their overall evaluation of the child's school, charter school parents are also much more likely to assign higher grades than other DC public school parents. These differences are evident despite increasingly stringent controls for factors that might have driven up scores.
Most importantly, these differences withstand tests for the likelihood that parents who choose charter schools may be systematically different than parents whose children 16 15 stay enrolled in traditional public schoolsand that those differences might account for the higher evaluation of charter schools. We believe that our data show that the act of choice alone is not behind the higher satisfaction and higher evaluations we found for charter schools: There is a foundation for the higher evaluations parents give to the DC charter schools beyond the act of choosing. 17 16 (245 non-parents and 19 not in DC) households that were coded in at least one contact attempt as parents in DC but were later recoded as non-parents. The status of these numbers is ambiguous and could reflect the actions of respondents to avoid an interview.
If all of these numbers are included (probably an overestimate) the incidence of parents in the sample increases to 18.18 percent.
Of those households identified as obtaining a parent of a child in a DC school 
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